THE UNIT ROOT PROPERTY WHEN MARKETS ARE SEQUENTIALLY INCOMPLETE by Antonio Jiménez-Martínez & Subir Chattopadhyay
THE UNIT ROOT PROPERTY WHEN MARKETS
ARE SEQUENTIALLY INCOMPLETE*
Subir Chattopadhyay and Antonio Jim¶ enez-Mart¶ inez**
WP-AD 2000-32
Correspondence to Subir Chattopadhyay, Departamento de Fundamentos de An¶ alisis Econ¶ omico,
Universidad de Alicante, Campus de San Vicente del Raspeig, 03071 Alicante, e-mail: subir@merlin.fae.ua.es
Editor: Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Econ¶ omicas, S.A.
First Edition December 2000.
Dep¶ osito Legal: V-5169-2000
IVIE working papers o®er in advance the results of economic research under way in or-
der to encourage a discussion process before sending them to scienti¯c journals for their ¯nal
publication.
* We thank H.M. Polemarchakis for useful discussions. Chattopadhyay gratefully acknowledges
¯nancial support from CONACYT via a C¶ atedra de Excelencia at El Colegio de M¶ exico, additional
support from the Ivie and DGICyT project PB97-0131, and the hospitality of ColMex; A. Jim¶ enez-
Mart¶ inez acknowledges support form the DGCyT in the form of a Doctoral Fellowship, additional support
from the Ivie and the hospitality of CORE and ColMex where part of the research was carried out.
** S. Chattopadhyay & A. Jim¶ enez-Mart¶ inez: University of Alicante.
1THE UNIT ROOT PROPERTY WHEN MARKETS
ARE SEQUENTIALLY INCOMPLETE
Subir Chattopadhyay and Antonio Jim¶ enez-Mart¶ inez
ABSTRACT
We consider pure exchange, one good OLG economies under stationary Markov uncer-
tainty. It is known that when markets are sequentially complete, a stationary equilibrium
at which the agents common matrix of intertemporal rates of substitution has a Perron
root which is less than or equal to one is conditionally Pareto optimal (CPO). We assume
that there exists a long-lived dividend paying asset and show that if dividends are strictly
positive then the relation between the unit root condition and optimality holds even if
markets are not sequentially complete. However, every equilibrium allocation is shown
to be constrained CPO under the additional requirement that assets be freely disposable,
which seems reasonable when dividends are positive and whose importance was pointed
out by Santos and Woodford (1997) in their work on bubbles; this fact undermines the
relation between the unit root property and optimality. The relation is less clear when
dividends and asset prices are allowed to be negative in some states.
JEL Nos.: D52, D61
KEYWORDS: Stochastic Overlapping Generations Models, Incomplete Markets, Pareto
Optimality, Free Disposal
21. INTRODUCTION
In overlapping generations (OLG) economies with sequential trading, the demographic
structure of the model severely restricts the possibilities for trade. These restrictions
become even more relevant when one considers economies with uncertainty. The study
of intertemporal risk sharing in these OLG models is of interest because it provides a
framework for the debate on some macroeconomic issues, social security systems being
the most important example.
It is known that when enough markets exist to let agents insure against all risks that
arise after their birth, so that markets are sequentially complete, a stationary equilibrium
is optimal if and only if it satis¯es the unit root property, i.e., the Perron root of every
agent's matrix of marginal rates of substitution is less than or equal to one. The notion
of optimality used is that of conditional Pareto optimality (CPO) proposed by Muench
(1977) in which the Pareto criterion is applied in an environment in which agents are
distinguished by their state of birth in addition to the date of their birth and their type.
Our objective is to analyze the optimal allocation of risk in OLG economies where
markets are potentially not even sequentially complete, i.e., where agents are unable to
insure themselves completely against even those sources of uncertainty which arise after
their birth. It is easy to see that if there are no long-lived assets in the economy then
it is impossible to have non-zero net intergenerational transfers and as a consequence
the OLG structure becomes redundant. So we consider economies in which there exists
a \tree", i.e., an asset which pays a dividend in each state and which can be retraded
repeatedly (the dividend can be negative and could also be identically zero). We provide
separate necessary and su±cient conditions on the con¯guration of dividends and asset
prices under which equilibria are optimal. We are able to relate these conditions to the
unit root property when dividends are positive.
We consider a simple environment with stationary Markov uncertainty and only one
consumption good. Since we wish to analyze the optimality properties of equilibria,
we need to specify a notion of optimality which is appropriate for our purposes; we
propose a de¯nition which takes into account the fact that markets may be sequentially
incomplete by requiring that consumption possibilities when old be determined by the
returns generated by the set of assets that are available. To be precise, optimality of an
allocation is gauged against alternatives in which consumption when young and an asset
portfolio are allocated directly, while consumption when old is speci¯ed via the return
on the portfolio and the agent's endowment. Since there is only one good, this scheme
completely speci¯es consumption possibilities once the return on assets is determined. We
will assume that assets earn their equilibrium return even though the portfolio allocation
has been changed.1 An allocation can be constrained improved if there exists a constrained
feasible allocation in the sense just described which is also a CPO improvement.
1So we do not consider the price e®ects that form an essential part of the analysis of generic con-
strained suboptimality of two period multi-good general equilibrium models with incomplete markets as
in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986).
3We show that if the stationary equilibrium is one in which the dividend is strictly
positive in every state in which the price of the asset plus the dividend is negative, then
the allocation can be improved upon by reallocating the existing assets in a stationary
way. On the other hand we show that a stationary equilibrium allocation is constrained
CPO if the sum of the price of the long-lived asset and its dividend is non-negative in every
state and is strictly positive in some state; this condition implies that the price of the asset
is always positive. In particular, imposing non-negativity of the dividend process and free
disposal of the long-lived asset guarantees that the equilibrium allocation is constrained
CPO.
Regarding the relation between the unit root property and the results obtained, we are
able to show that when dividends are non-negative our su±cient condition for constrained
CPO is also su±cient to imply that the Perron root is less than one. Similarly, with non-
negative dividends (but not zero in every state), our su±cient condition for constrained
suboptimality implies that the equilibrium prices of the long-lived asset have negative
sign in some states which, as we show, implies that the Perron root exceeds one. The role
of the unit root property in determining the e±ciency properties of equilibrium seems to
be severely limited when more general dividend processes are allowed for.
Turning to the literature, recall that Wilson (1981) showed that in an in¯nite horizon
economy the presence of an individual who owns a non-negligible fraction of the total
endowment forces the value of the aggregate endowment to be ¯nite; it follows that
competitive equilibria are Pareto optimal. Scheinkman (1980) argued that the presence
of an asset which is freely disposable and which pays a dividend in every period would
ensure Pareto optimality in OLG economies under certainty; such as asset is a way of
implementing Wilson's condition in a sequence economy. Santos and Woodford (1997)
provide a direct generalization of Wilson's result and show that in a multi-good model with
sequentially complete markets, all equilibria are CPO provided that the dividend from
the long-lived asset is a signi¯cant proportion of the endowment at each date-event.2
A more special model appears in Allen and Gale (1997) who consider an economy
with one good and one agent in every period, so that markets are e®ectively sequentially
complete, and show that the introduction of a dividend paying asset into this special
model implies that the resulting stationary equilibrium allocation is CPO.
Two other papers have asked related questions. Following the lines of Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis (1986), Cass, Green, and Spear (1992) considered the stationary monetary
2More generally, by invoking the \no arbitrage" property of asset prices one easily shows that the sum
of the agents' budget constraints weighted by the Arrow price at the date-event at which they are born (we
use the fact that with one good the optimization problem faced by each agent can be written as one with
a single budget constraint even though markets are incomplete) is the same as the sum of the planner's
feasibility constraints weighted by the Arrow price at the node. Lemma 2.4 in Santos and Woodford
(1997) can be used to show that a strictly positive dividend and free disposal of the asset implies that a
stationary equilibrium allocation has ¯nite value under every possible Arrow pricing process. It follows
that every stationary equilibrium allocation is constrained CPO. However, our su±cient condition for
constrained CPO appears to be substantially weaker since it allows for zero dividends.
4equilibria of a one-good stochastic OLG economy with incomplete asset markets and
showed that there are no locally improving stationary redistributions of the one period
lived assets when the price of money and the agents' money demands are allowed to
adjust in response to the redistribution. The equilibrium that they consider displays the
unit root property. Gottardi (1996) considers a model which is similar to the one in Cass,
Green, and Spear (1992), and stationary redistributions of the sort we consider; he ignores
the welfare of the initial old which is the crucial di®erence between his approach and ours.
A complete characterization (in terms of dividends and asset prices) of the optimality
properties of equilibria in OLG economies with sequential trading is available in Chat-
topadhyay (2000). The case in which after the portfolio reassignment agents are allowed
to retrade, as in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986), is of considerable interest; it
turns out that all equilibria, regardless of the sign of asset prices, are locally constrained
optimal (Chattopadhyay (2000)). The case with more than one good is yet to be analysed.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
notation. In Section 3 we brie°y discuss the unit root property and relate it to the
description of the economy. Section 4 presents our main results on constrained optimality
of stationary equilibria of the one-good economy when markets fail to be sequentially
complete and Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the results.
2. THE MODEL
We consider a one good, two period lifetime, pure exchange overlapping generations (OLG)
economy under stationary Markov uncertainty. We turn to a formal description of the
model and the notation used.3
Time is discrete and dates are denoted by t =1 ;2;3;¢¢¢.
Let S be the state space of the Markov process with S := #S < 1. The structure
of the date-event tree induced by all possible realizations of states from an initial date
t = 0 is as follows. The root o ft h et r e ei s¾0 2S ;t h es e to fnodes at date t is denoted §t
w h e r ew es e t§ 1 := f¾0g£S, and, iteratively, set §t := §t¡1 £Sfor t =2 ;3;¢¢¢. De¯ne
§: =[t¸1§t and ¡ := f¾0g[§. Elements of ¡ are called nodes (to be thought of as
the \date-events" or simply \events"), and a generic node is denoted by ¾.G i v e nan o d e
¾ 2 §, t(¾) denotes the value of t at which ¾ 2 §t,a n ds(¾) identi¯es the Markov state.
Clearly, a node ¾ 2 §t i sn o t h i n gb u tas t r i n g( ¾0;s 1;s 2;¢¢¢;s t); where s¿ 2Sdenotes the
realization of the process at date ¿, ¿ =1 ;¢¢¢;t(¾0 is the realization at the initial date).
It follows that the predecessor of a node ¾ 2 §t is uniquely de¯ned; it will be denoted by
¾¡1,a ne l e m e n to f§ t¡1. The set of immediate successor nodes of a node ¾ is denoted ¾+.
One commodity is available for consumption at each node ¾ 2 §.
At each node ¾ 2 §, H, a generation of agents, is born, where H := #H. Each agent
lives at two dates. The consumption plan of an agent speci¯es the level of consumption
in the event at birth and in its immediate successor nodes. A member of generation ¾ of
3We use the notation developed in Chattopadhyay and Gottardi (1999).
5type h 2His denoted by (¾;h).
In addition, there is a set of H one period lived agents who enter the economy at each
node ¾ 2 §1 at date 1; they constitute the generation of the \initial old", and are indexed
by (¾;h;o); where ¾ 2 §1.
We will assume that the economy is stationary, i.e., that the characteristics (con-
sumption sets, endowments, and utility functions) of each agent depend only on the
realizations of the Markov state during her lifetime, not on time nor on past realiza-
tions. So, for any (¾; b ¾) 2 § £ §, s(¾)=s(b ¾) implies that (i) for consumption sets
X¾;h = X^ ¾;h := Xs(¾);h, (ii) for endowments !(¾;h)=!(b ¾;h): =!(s(¾);h), where
!(s;h)=( !(s;s;h);(!(s;s0;s;h))s02S) describes the endowment at birth and in all suc-
cessor nodes, and (iii) for utility functions u¾;h = u^ ¾;h := us(¾);h (for the initial old we use
the notation Xs(¾);h;o, !(s(¾);h;o), and us(¾);h;o). Let !(s;h;o)=!(~ s;s;~ s;h) for all s 2S
and for all h 2Hfor some ~ s 2S;t h i sl e t su si n t r o d u c et h ei n i t i a lo l di nam a n n e rw h i c h
is compatible with the stationary structure of the rest of the economy.
A consumption plan for agent (¾;h) will be denoted by x(¾;h)=( x(¾;¾;h);(x(¾0;¾;h))¾02¾+)
(x(¾;h;o) for the initial old); this notation allows us to consider nonstationary consump-
tion plans even though the environment is stationary.
There is a set J of one period lived assets, where #J =: J · S ¡ 1, with stationary
payo®s (per unit) in the commodity described by ((rj





Since they are one period lived, it is natural to suppose that their total endowment is
zero, i.e., they are inside assets.
There is also a dividend paying asset with stationary payo® (per unit) speci¯ed by the
vector ((ds)s2S) 2 RS.L e td := (d1;¢¢¢;d S). Since they are one period lived,
Only the initial old are endowed with the asset and their endowment of the asset is
denoted by !d(s(¾);h;o). We will assume that
P
h2H !d(s(¾);h;o)=1f o ra l ls 2S.










h2H!(s(¾¡1);s(¾);s(¾¡1);h)+1¢ds(¾) for ¾ 2[ t¸2§t:
We impose the following standard conditions:
ASSUMPTION 1:
(i) 1 · H<1 and 1 · S<1.
(iia) For all (s;h;o) 2S£H ;X s;h;o = R+;u s;h;o : Xs;h;o ! R is strictly monotone.
(iib) For all (s;h) 2S£H ;X s;h = R1+S
+ ;! (s;s;h) 2 R++ and ( (!(s;s0;s;h))s02S) 2
RS
+=f0g;u s;h : Xs;h ! R is C2, strictly monotone, and di®erentiably strictly quasi-
concave.
(iiia) !(s;h;o)=!(~ s;s;~ s;h)f o ra l ls 2Sand for all h 2Hfor some ~ s 2S.
(iiib) !d(s(¾);h;o) 2 R+ for all s 2Sand for all h 2Hand
P
h2H !d(s(¾);h;o) = 1 for
all s 2S.
(iv) For all ¾ 2 §, !(¾) 2 R++.
6DEFINITION 1: A feasible allocation x i sg i v e nb ya na r r a y
((x(¾;h;o))(¾;h)2§1£H,( x(¾;h))(¾;h)2§£H) such that x(¾;h;o) 2 Xs(¾);h;o for all (¾;h) 2








h2Hx(¾;¾¡1;h) · !(¾) for all ¾ 2[ t¸2§t.
We now introduce the notion of stationary equilibrium. Denote the stationary prices
of the dividend paying asset by qd
s 2 R and for the jth inside asset by qj
s 2 R,b o t hi n
state s.L e tqd := (qd
1;¢¢¢;qd




S), j 2J, be the vectors of stationary
prices of the assets and let qs := (qd
s;q1
s;¢¢¢;qJ
s), s 2S , be the vector of asset prices in
state s. Given the nature of the problem, it is easy to see that the price of the commodity
can be normalized to 1 at every node.
Stationarity of the equilibrium requires that x(¾;h)=x(s(¾);h) for all (¾;h) 2 §£H
(i.e., the consumption allocation of each agent depends on the state at the date of
his birth and the states at the next date only); a stationary consumption plan for
agent (¾;h), with s = s(¾), will be denoted by x(s;h)=( x(s;s;h);(x(s;s0;s;h))s02S)
(x(s;h;o) for the initial old). Stationary asset demands will be denoted by µ(s;h)=
(µd(s;h);µ 1(s;h);¢¢¢;µ J(s;h)) for (s;h) 2S£H . We also need to assign asset holdings
to the initial old denoted µ(s;h;o); we allow the asset holding of the initial old to depend
on the state of birth.
DEFINITION 2 (SCE):4 ((x¤(s;h;o))s2S;h2H;(µ¤(s;h;o))s2S;h2H;(x¤(s;h))s2S;h2H;
(µ¤(s;h))s2S;h2H;qd¤;(qj¤)j2J)i sastationary competitive equilibrium with a sequence of
markets (SCE) if:
(i) x¤ is a feasible stationary allocation;
(ii) for all s 2S,
P
h2H µ¤(s;h;o)=( 1 ;0;¢¢¢;0) and
P
h2H µ¤(s;h)=( 1 ;0;¢¢¢;0);
(iii) for all s 2S, and for every h 2H













(iv) for all s 2S ,a n df o re v e r yh 2H
(a) x¤(s;s;h)+q¤







s0 for all s0 2S;
(b) if us;h(x) >u s;h(x¤(s;h)) then either
x(s;s;h)+q¤







s0 for some s0 2S .
REMARK 1: We have imposed the condition that all asset markets must clear exactly
and have not imposed free disposal of asset prices. Also, the de¯nition of stationary
4We ignore the existence of restrictions on the size of trades in the dividend paying assets.
7equilibrium applies even when markets are sequentially complete, that is, if in every state
the returns from the 1+J assets span RS. We make no claims regarding existence; results
on existence are available in certain special cases, e.g., when d =0so that the long-lived
asset is money.







subject to : x + q¤
s ¢ µ · !(s;s;h).
So each agent, e®ectively, solves an optimization problem with a single budget constraint
and will meet the constraint with equality. This property leads to the constrained opti-
mality of all equilibria in two period economies.
3. THE UNIT ROOT PROPERTY
In this section we elucidate the relation between equilibrium prices and a certain number,
the Perron root, which is associated with the optimization problem of each agent. This is
important since it is known that when markets are sequentially complete the value of this
number completely characterizes the optimality properties of the equilibrium allocation.





let Mh(x¤) be the strictly positive square matrix with elements ms;s0;h(x¤). By Perron's
Theorem (see, e.g., Theorem 8.2.8 in Horn and Johnson (1985)), there exists a unique
vector (up to normalization) with all components positive, zh 2 RS
++, such that [zh]
T¢Mh =
¸h ¢ [zh]
T for some number ¸h 2 R++.T h e n u m b e r¸h is the Perron root of the matrix
Mh, and is the largest eigenvalue, in absolute value, of the matrix.
The next result shows that if dividends are nonnegative (and not always zero) then the
Perron root exceeds one if and only if the price of the dividend paying asset is negative
in some state. We are unable to say anything of interest about the value of the Perron
root when dividends are allowed to be negative.
PROPOSITION 1: Consider an equilibrium in which for some agent h 2H , x¤(s;h) 2
R1+S
++ for all s 2S . (i) If dividends are non-negative, d 2 RS
+, and assets are freely
disposable and non-trivial, qd¤ 2 RS
+=f0g,t h e n¸h 2 (0;1]. (ii) If dividends are non-
negative and non-trivial, d 2 RS
+=f0g,a n dqd
s
¤ < 0 for some s 2S,t h e n¸h > 1.
PROOF: From the ¯rst order conditions for the optimal choice of µd¤(s;h), as s varies,
we obtain a set of matrix equations which must hold for all h 2Hwith x¤(s;h) 2 R1+S
++
for all s 2S
q
d¤
= Mh ¢ (q
d¤
+ d);q
j¤ = Mh ¢ r
j:







T ¢ Mh ¢ (q
d¤




5For f : RN
++ ! R,
df (¹ x)
dxi denotes the partial derivative of the function f with respect to its i-th
coordinate evaluated at the point ¹ x.
8, ¸h ¢ [zh]




where ¸h > 0.
(i) Clearly, if d 2 RS
+ and qd¤ 2 RS
+=f0g then ¸h 2 (0;1] as required.
(iia) Suppose that qd¤
s < 0 for all s 2S . Since, under the stated condition on
dividends, [zh]
T ¢ d>0, and ¸h > 0, while [zh]
T ¢ qd¤ < 0, we must have ¸h > 1, as
required.




¤ < 0 for some s;s0 2S , s 6= s0,s ot h a tqd
s
¤ > 0 for
some s 2S . De¯ne ~ qs := maxfqd
s
¤;0g,f o rs 2S , and construct the vector ~ q 2 RS
+=f0g;
~ q 6=0 ,s i n c eqd
s
¤ > 0 for some s 2S ,a n d~ q ¡ qd¤ > 0.6 Since Mh is a strictly positive
matrix we have (i) Mh ¢ [~ q + d] >> 0;a l s oMh ¢ [qd¤ + d] << Mh ¢ [~ q + d] so that the
¯rst order condition implies that (ii) qd¤ << Mh ¢ [~ q + d]. Since for s such that qd
s
¤ ¸ 0,
~ qs = qd
s
¤, while for s such that qd
s
¤ < 0, ~ qs =0>q d
s
¤, (i) and (ii) together imply that
~ q< <M h ¢ [~ q + d]:
Premultiplying by the Perron vector, using the fact that ~ q>0, and using (1), we obtain
0 < [zh]
T ¢ ~ q<¸ h ¢ [zh]
T ¢ ~ q + ¸h ¢ [zh]
T ¢ d = ¸h ¢ [zh]




T ¢ [~ q ¡ q
d¤] <¸ h ¢ [zh]
T ¢ [~ q ¡ q
d¤]:
As we noted earlier, ~ q ¡ qd¤ > 0; it follows that ¸h > 1.
A natural question concerns the possibility of obtaining equilibria in which the price
of the dividend paying asset is negative in some state even though the dividend is always
non-negative. The example that follows gives an a±rmative answer.
EXAMPLE 1:7 Let there be one good, two Markov states, fsa;s bg, with transition prob-
abilities ¼sa;sa = ¼sb;sb =0 :75, and d(sa) = 1 while d(sb)=0 :5. There is one agent with
preferences described by u(cs;c s;sa;c s;sb)=l n cs+¼s;salncs;sa +¼s;sblncs;sb and endowments
(!sa;! sa;sa;! sa;sb)=( 1 4 6 =7;6;3) and (!sb;! sb;sa;! sb;sb)=( 9 1 =22;6;3). It may be veri¯ed
that qsa = ¡2a n dqsb = :5 constitute equilibrium prices.
If the market is sequentially complete, i.e., J ¸ S ¡ 1 and the assets span RS,t h e
matrix Mh is necessarily the same for all the agents and there is an unambiguous value
for ¸. The equilibrium is said to exhibit the unit root property if the Perron root is less
than or equal to one.
When the market fails to be sequentially complete, e.g., because J<S ¡ 1, the
matrices Mh typically di®er across agents. Proposition 1, however, continues to apply.
6When comparing two vectors x and y of the same dimension we use the symbols \·", \<", and
\<<"t oi n d i c a t exn · yn for all n, xn · yn for all n but x 6= y,a n dxn <y n for all n respectively.
7This example builds on an example of a deterministic economy that appeared in an earlier version of
Santos and Woodford (1997). They attribute it to W. Brock, the probable reference being Brock (1990).
94. CONSTRAINED OPTIMALITY
We want to analyze the optimality properties of the stationary equilibria that we have
de¯ned. We begin by introducing a notion of optimality which applies the criterion of
Pareto e±ciency to the economy above where agents are distinguished by the event at
their birth. This yields the criterion of conditional Pareto Optimality, due to Muench
(1977):
DEFINITION 3 (CPO): Let x be a feasible allocation. x is conditionally Pareto optimal
(CPO) if there does not exist another feasible allocation b x such that
(i) for all (¾;h) 2 §1 £H , us(¾);h;o(b x(¾;h;o)) ¸ us(¾);h;o(x(¾;h;o)),
for all (¾;h) 2 § £H , us(¾);h(b x(¾;h)) ¸ us(¾);h(x(¾;h));
(ii) either for some (¾0;h 0) 2 §1 £H , us(¾0);h0;o(b x(¾0;h
0;o)) >u s(¾0);h0;o(x(¾0;h
0;o)),
or for some (¾0;h 0) 2 § £H , us(¾0);h0(b x(¾0;h
0)) >u s(¾0);h0(x(¾0;h
0)).
It is by now well known that a stationary equilibrium allocation obtained with sequen-
tially complete markets is CPO if and only if the unit root property holds (see Aiyagari and
Peled (1991), Chattopadhyay and Gottardi (1999), and Demange and Laroque (1999)).8
When markets fail to be sequentially complete, the equilibrium allocation is typically
not CPO. The argument is the same as the one used in two period economies, i.e., the
vectors of marginal rates of substitution di®er across agents. What constitutes an ap-
p r o p r i a t et e s to fe ± c i e n c yi nt h i sc a s ei sap r o b l e m a t i cp o i n t . H e r ew eu s ead e ¯ n i t i o n
that requires the planner to allocate resources using the existing assets and holding asset
prices at their equilibrium value. Recall that
P
h2H !d(s;h;o) = 1 so that only one unit
of the dividend paying asset is available in the economy.
DEFINITION 4 (q¤-CF): A feasible allocation b x is q¤-constrained feasible if there exist
((b µd(s;h;o))s2S;h2H); (((b µj(s;h;o))s2S;h2H)j2J); ((b µd(¾;h))¾2§;h2H); (((b µj(¾;h))¾2§;h2H)j2J))
such that:
(ia) for all s 2S,
P
h2H
b µd(s;h;o) · 1a n d
P
h2H
b µj(s;h;o) = 0 for all j 2J,
(ib) for all ¾ 2 §,
P
h2H
b µd(¾;h) · 1a n d
P
h2H
b µj(¾;h) = 0 for all j 2J;
















s0 for all s0 2S.
DEFINITION 5 (q¤-CF): An allocation b x is a q¤-constrained improvement if it is q¤-
constrained feasible and a CPO improvement.
8The result in Chattopadhyay and Gottardi (1999) provides a complete characterization of those
competitive equilibria that are CPO and that can be obtained via trade in contingent commodity markets.
The kind of equilibrium constructed in Example 1 cannot be obtained via trade in contingent commodity
markets so that the unit root characterization does not apply to it. However, Chattopadhyay (2000)
provide a characterization result which covers such cases.
10It is easy to show that if the unit root condition holds then there is no stationary
allocation with positive net intertemporal transfers which is a CPO improvement. Hence,
any potential improvement must come from intragenerational transfers alone. But with
only one good traded, no such improvement can exist. This observation gives a direct
and simple proof of the result in Cass, Green, and Spear (1992) who show that there are
no local stationary improvements over a monetary equilibrium with positive asset prices
in all states, i.e., the unit root condition holds.
We now provide a condition under which a stationary constrained improvement can be
constructed. The condition is a generalization of the con¯guration of prices and dividends
in Brock's deterministic example since it requires that the equilibrium price of the long
lived asset has negative sign in some state.9
PROPOSITION 2: Consider an interior stationary equilibrium with sequential markets.
Let ¹ S := fs 2S: qd
s
¤ + ds < 0g.I f¹ S6 = ; and ds > 0 for all s 2 ¹ S, then there exists a
stationary q¤-constrained improvement.
PROOF: We construct a q¤-feasible allocation which CPO improves over the equilibrium
allocation.




2,w h e r ec>0i sa nu p p e rb o u n do nt h e
curvature of the agents' indi®erence surfaces. c is well de¯ned given Assumption 1 (since
di®erentiability and strict monotonicity of the utility function implies that each agent's
indi®erence surface has bounded curvature at each point) and the fact that a stationary
allocation is speci¯ed by a ¯nite set of vectors (one for each type of agent born in each
of S di®erent states). Let ¢ := ¡mins2 ¹ Sj¢(s)j.S o ¢ < 0. Choose an agent born in
each of the Markov states s 2 ¹ S, denoted (s;¹ h), and set b µd(s;¹ h): =µd¤(s;¹ h)+¢a t
every date. Also set b x(s;s;¹ h): =x¤(s;s;¹ h)+[ qd
s
¤ + ds](¡1)¢. Do not change any other
variables for the initial old or agents born in states not in ¹ S. Clearly, in states faced by
(s;¹ h) when old at which [qd
s0
¤ + ds0] > 0, i.e., when s0 2S n¹ S,a g e n t( s;¹ h)c o n s u m e sless
of the good relative to the equilibrium allocation (and this amount is available as slack)
while he consumes more in the states s 2 ¹ S. At each such state we have a young agent
who consumes less, thus maintaining feasibility, and whose portfolio assignment has been
changed. The marginal change in utility experienced by the agent when old, normalized
by the marginal utility of consumption when young, due to the change in his portfolio can
be computed from the ¯rst order condition and is given by qd
s
¤¢, while the (normalized)
change due to the change in consumption when young is [qd
s
¤ + ds](¡1)¢. Summing the
two components, and using the de¯nition of ¢, we get the net marginal change in the
utility value of the agent's allocation, ds(¡1)¢ > 0. In order to ensure that the agent
(s;¹ h) is being improved, it is su±cient that the net marginal change in the utility value
of the allocation satisfy the following quadratic inequality where c is as speci¯ed earlier,
9By writing relative prices in terms of discounted prices of the commodity one shows that the equi-
librium in Brock's example is in°ationary which is generally indicative of suboptimality.






Since j¢j·j ¢(s)j and the inequality is speci¯ed by a quadratic function, it su±ces to


























COROLLARY 1: With sequentially incomplete markets and strictly positive dividends,
a stationary equilibrium allocation at which the Perron root of some agent's matrix of
marginal rates of substitution exceeds one can be q¤-constrained CPO improved.
The proof follows by noting that under the stated condition on the Perron root, Propo-
sition 1 implies that the price of the dividend paying asset must be negative in some state.
But then the ¯rst order conditions for optimal choice of the dividend paying asset imply
that the set ¹ S speci¯ed in Proposition 2 is non-empty. Hence, the fact that dividends are
strictly positive allows us to invoke Proposition 2 to complete the proof.
We turn to su±cient conditions under which the stationary equilibrium allocation is
q¤-constrained CPO.
PROPOSITION 3: Consider a stationary equilibrium with sequential markets. If qd
s
¤ +
ds ¸ 0 for all s 2S , qd
~ s
¤ + d~ s > 0 for some ~ s 2S , then the allocation is q¤-constrained
CPO.
PROOF: Under the stated hypotheses, qd
s
¤ > 0 for all s 2S ; this follows from the ¯rst
order conditions.
Let b x denote a q¤-constrained feasible allocation. For ¾ 2 §a n dh 2H ,d e ¯ n e
¢b x(¾;¾;h): =b x(¾;¾;h) ¡ x¤(¾;¾;h).
Using De¯nition 4 together with the budget constraints speci¯ed in De¯nition 2, and





b µd(s(¾);h;o) ¡ 1] ¢ [qd¤





b µd(¾;h) ¡ 1] ¢ [qd¤
s0 + ds0]f o r a l l ¾ 2 §a n ds0 2S.
These restrictions delimit the net changes in consumption when old by the requirement
that they be asset market feasible. By combining these restrictions with the aggregate
feasibility condition speci¯ed in De¯nition 1, and noting that at equilibrium the aggregate






s(¾) +ds(¾)] · 0f o r a l l ¾ 2 §1 (2a)





b µd(¾;h) ¡ 1] ¢ [qd¤
s0 + ds0] · 0 for all ¾ 2 §a n d
s0 2S. (2b)
Now suppose that the allocation b x is also a CPO improvement. Since agents are locally
non-satiated (this follows trivially for the initial old and follows from Remark 2 for the
rest of the agents), the improving allocation must be at least as costly as the equilibrium
allocation for every agent and strictly more costly for some agent. So, considering the




b µd(s(¾);h;o) ¡ 1] ¢ [qd¤
s(¾) + ds(¾)] ¸ 0 for all ¾ 2 §1, (3a)






b µd(¾;h) ¡ 1] ¸ 0 for all ¾ 2 §( 3 b )
with strict inequality for some ¾ 2 §.
The necessary condition for improving the initial old, (3a), together with the feasibility
condition on allocating the dividend paying asset,
P
h2H
b µd(s;h;o) · 1, and the hypothesis




s(¾) +ds(¾)] = 0 for all ¾ 2 §1.
It follows from (2a) that
P
h2H ¢b x(¾;¾;h) · 0 for all ¾ 2 §1. But then (3b) together with
P
h2H
b µd(¾;h) · 1 implies that
P
h2H
b µd(¾;h) = 1 provided that qd¤
s(¾) > 0 which holds as
noted at the beginning of the proof. But now an iterative argument, node by node, shows
that there can be no q¤-constrained feasible improvement since (3b) will always hold with
equality.
COROLLARY 2: With sequentially incomplete markets, non-negative and non-trivial
dividends, and free disposal of the asset, all stationary equilibrium allocations are q¤-
constrained CPO.
The proof of Corollary 1 follows directly from Proposition 3 by noting that under the
stated conditions the price of the asset is necessarily positive in every state.
5. DISCUSSION
The nature of the relationship between the unit root property and optimality when mar-
kets fail to be sequentially complete can now be addressed. Corollaries 1 and 2 have shown
that when the dividend vector is strictly positive the unit root condition is necessary and
su±cient to determine the optimality properties of a stationary equilibrium. The relation
between the unit root property and optimality breaks down when the dividend vector is
non-negative but with some zero entries; simple examples exist in which, for some agent,
the Perron root exceeds one, so that the price of the asset is negative in some states, but
these are states in which the dividend is zero so that Proposition 2 does not apply. Very
little can be said when the dividend vector has negative components as Proposition 1 does
not extend to such cases.
So the relation between the unit root condition and optimality does survive into the
domain of sequentially incomplete markets provided that dividends are strictly positive;
this extension of the unit root property is undermined by the fact that under the stated
13conditions and the additional requirement that assets be freely disposable, which seems
reasonable when dividends are positive, every equilibrium allocation is constrained CPO.
The relation is less clear when more general speci¯cations are allowed for the dividend
p r o c e s sa sw e l la sp r i c e s .
The extent to which the results change when we require the improving allocation to
be obtainable as an equilibrium is of interest. It turns out that all equilibria are locally
constrained CPO so long as only one good is traded as shown in Chattopadhyay (2000).
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